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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GARY L. REICH, et al
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN
SANITARY DISTRICT NO. 1,
Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO.
12890

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages for
property damaged as a result of a blockage and back-up in
defendant's sewer line.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The action of the four homeowner plaintiffs were consolidated for trial on the issue of liability only and were tried
bdore Judge Marcellus K. Snow sitting with a jury which
returned a general verdict in favor of defendant ( R. 7 4-7 5).
Judge Snow granted a new trial and the liability issue was
retried before Judge Joseph G. Jeppson who submitted the

case to the jury on a Special Verdict (R. 123-125). The jury
returned the Special Verdict finding that plaintiffs had failed
to meet their burden of proof on most issues, which would
have compelled judgment being entered for defendant (R.
12 3-12 5 & 3 3 3). The Court refused to receive the verdict.
( R. 3 30-3 31) and gave the jury additional written instruc·
tions ( R. 126) . The jury then revised some of their findings
(R. 123-125) and judgment was entered in favor of plain·
tiffs ( R. 168-169) . Defendant's motion for a new trial ( R.
166-167) was denied ( R. 177). For the purJX>se of this inter·
mediate appeal, the propriety of further instructing the jury
after the first verdict was returned, or the validity of the re·
vised special verdict are not being contested.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant prays for a reversal of the judgment on the
issue of liability entered by the trial court on the Special Ver·
diet as finally returned by the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(The following statement of facts is cited from the Sec·
ond trial.)

The basements of plaintiffs' homes were flooded by a
back-up of sewage on October 7, 1968, which resulted from a
temJX>rary blockage in defendant's eight inch main sewer line
on Terrace View Drive near the intersection of Millcreek Road.
The adequacy of design of the sewer system was not con·
tested (R. 276-277). Likewise, there was no contention that
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defendant's routine maintenance procedures did not meet the
standard of care in this community and no evidence was offered
to the contrary.
The blockage which caused the flooding cleared spontaneously and, therefore, the material which constituted the
plug was never positively identified. Following the flooding,
defendant's personnel examined the line in question on Terrace View Drive from the manhole at the intersection of Millcreek Road to the manhole at the intersection of 3300 South,
which was about two or three blocks north of where the blockage occurred ( R. 305) and no root growth or other obstructions were found ( R. 3 17).
Some small rocks and a small piece of building block
were removed from the manhole at 3 300 South. There was no
indication whether or not these items had constituted part of
the plug which caused the flooding in question. Two other
east-west sewer lines intersect the Terrace View line between
th Millcreek Road junction and the line at 3300 South ( R.
31) . When the rocks and piece of building block were placed
inside a section of eight inch sewer pipe, it was obvious that
they, by themselves, would not have caused a blockage of the
sewer main in question and chat ocher items more impervious
to the passage of water, such as a plastic bag, diaper, etc.,
would have had to have made up part of the plug ( R. 79-80).
On October 2, 1968, five days before the flooding in
question occurred ( R. 239), defendant's sewer line running
east and west on Millcreek Road, which joined the Terrace
View Line just above plaintiffs' homes, was broken by Gibbons and Reed Construction Company ( R. 239), which was
laying a new water line in connection with their construction
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work on
Belt Route Freeway. There is a possibility that
some debns entered the sewer line at that time. Mr. Bun
Ancell, a field inspector for Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson
engineers for defendant, inspected the brake immediately u
being notified of it and arrived at the site of the break w:e
the Gibbons and Reed employees were still cleaning it up
and found the sewer line to be free of debris and running
freely. He had the broken area covered with a piece of ply.
wood until a changeover to a new line was effected later that
day, which abandoned the segment of line containing the
break (R. 239-243).
The debris which was found at the 3 300 South manhole
did not contain any piece of broken sewer pipe. The piece ol
building material referred to above appeared to be a piece ol
S.C.R. brick ( R. 312).
The area serviced by the sewer line in question above
plaintiffs' residence contained about 270 homes (R. 278) and
about 100 manholes ( R. _279). Manholes cannot be locked
since tradesmen and others in the construction industry have
need of entering the manholes for a variety of purposes (R.
279 & 292-293). Because of the fact that access to a sewer
system is readily made through toilets in the homes and man·
holes in the streets, it is common to find many articles injected
into a sewer system which the system is not designed to handle (R. 272 & 291-292).
No evidence was introduced to the effect that defendant
violated the standard of care exercised by other sewer districts
- this
· community
· m
· performmg
· its
· routine
· mat·ntenance of the
m
.
.
.
.
.
.
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which was broken by Gibbons and Reed, or that either was a
proximate cause of the incident in question. The Court after
overruling the defendant's motion for non-suit and a directed
verdict (R. 318-321), submitted the case to the jury on a
special verdict, solely on the theory of res ipsa loquitur ( R.
123-125), over defendant's objection to the verdict form and
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine (R. 324-325). The jury answered
the factual issue as to whether or not defendant had exclusive
control of the sewer line in question at the time of the flooding
in the negative, both in their initial verdict and again after the
Court had given further instructions to the jury (R. 124,
Proposition No. 2).

POINT

I

RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT APPLY TO A
SEWER BLOCKAGE OF UNDETERMINED
ORIGIN.

In the instant case, a blockage occurred in defendant's
sewer system which resulted in a backup of sewage into plaintiffs' homes. The articles which formed the blockage, or where
or how they entered into the system is not known.
According to plaintiffs' expert, the line on which the
blockage occurred has a collection system embracing approximately 270 homes connected to the line above plaintiffs'
homes. Also, plaintiffs' expert and defendant's general manager testified that this area contained approximately 100 manholes which are accessible to construction and service personnel,
not to mention children who sometimes lift the manhole lids
1
nd inject foreign objects into the system.
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The Utah Supreme Court has long held that exclusive
control is a prerequisite to invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. In Jordan vs. Coca Cola Company, 117 Utah 578
'
218 P.2d 660 ( 1950), which involved a foreign substance in
a coke bottle, this Court recognized the doctrine and held that
where the facts showed a possibility of persons other than
the defendant being responsible for the foreign object in the
bottle, the doctrine could not be applied. On this point the
Court stated:
The instant case falls within the fourth situation.
It is obvious to all of us that a cap of the type used on
bottled soft drinks may be removed and replaced in
such manner as to practically defy detection. The as·
pect of control by the bottler of the product until it
reaches the ultimate consumer thus loses much of its
pursuasive weight where there exists the ability for
undetected tampering with the product after it leaves
the hands of the person sought to be charged, and an
inability to detect such tampering. . . .
The evidence in the present case fails to estab·
lish lack of opportunity for tampering, but on the
contrary establishes numerous opportunities for tam·
pering by mischief minded persons or those bearing
genuine ill will, as well as opportunities for substitution. We are informed of no less than fourteen persons
having access to the vending machine, in addition to
the fact that the key hanging in the guard closet presented an opportunity for others to gain access to the
machine. There is nothing to indicate that there was
not even more opportunity for tampering with the
Coca Cola stored in the foreman's office. Factories
and manufacturing plants where many men are thrown
together, are noted for the horseplay and practical
joking which there takes place, often with serious re·
suits.
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The Court re-affirmed its position in cases where persons
other than the one charged could inject foreign objects into the
thing in question. In Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 11 Utah 2d 30, 354 P.2d 580 (1960) the Court stated:
Counsel concedes that unless we reverse the Jordan case it would be controlling as to his res ipsa loquitur argument. He suggests such reversal, but we are
not constrained to agree. Chief Justice Pratt pointed
up the injustice that might eventuate by inferring negligence against a bottler in a case like this, where the
container has a cap that easily can be removed and replaced without detection, and over which container
the bottler has no further control in the hands of intermediaries including retailers, ultimate consumers, invitees to a party, or others who easily could have had
access to the bottle. No matter how careful or free
from responsibility the bottler may be, and though it be
impossible to demonstrate these facts in a given case,
failure to do so could result in liability without a plaintiff's presenting proof of anything, except by way of an
inference. (Emphasis added).
The doctrine of exclusive control was again recognized in
Talbot vs. L.D.S. Hospital, 21 Utah, 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872
( 1968) where plaintiff was injured during surgery while
under the care of several doctors. The Court observed:
In examining the facts of the case before us we
are of the opinion that there is insufficient foundation
on which to base the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
fact that plaintiff's disability resulted from an uncommon or rare occurrence does not relieve him of the
burden of establishing causation. An inference of negligence cannot be permitted solely upon the basis that
the plaintiff developed a rare complication while undergoing medical and surgical treatment. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur has no application unless it can be
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shown from past experience that the occurrence causing the disability is more likely the result of negligence
than some other cause. . .. The plaintiff's case in
this respect fails to meet the standards for the application of the doctrine as set forth in prior decisions of
this court. In this case the plaintiff asks the court to
extend the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a situation
where a number of people had control or partial control of the plaintiff during surgery and thereafter, and
where his injury may have occurred by the act or omission of any one of them, and outside the observation of
the others. It would seem to us that such an extension
to the doctrine would be unwarranted and it would
be using the doctrine to accomplish a result without
regard to its limitations.

!

Our review of the evidence indicates that the trial
court was correct in directing a verdict in favor of the
defendants. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
In a case almost exactly in point, Freitag vs. City of Montello, 153 N.W. 2d 505, (Wis. 1967), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be inapplicable.
In that case the plaintiff's home was flooded by a backage of
sewage, but the cause of the blockage was unknown, although, a year later an expert employed by the plaintiff found
about one-third of the sewer main to be blocked by root growth
(which situation we do not have in the instant case) . Regard·

ing res ipsa loquitur, the court said:
We turn now to the issue of whether the trial
court committed error in ruling that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
In Wisconsin, two elements must appear, before
a plaintiff is entitled to an instruction on res ipsa _loquitur: 1) The accident must be the kind which ordmanly
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does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;
2) It must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant.
The instant sewer main is not an instrumentality
entirely within the control of defendant with respect
to the materials that are deposited therein. As one of
the expert witnesses testified, the temporary obstruction
could have been caused by a plastic bag or a children's
toy. A lateral in the neighborhood had become clogged
from fish heads. Had the flooding of plaintiff's basement been caused by a defect, or break, in the sewer
main we then would have an instrumentality entirely
within the control of defendant.
Plaintiff correctly argues that, in Wisconsin, right
to control is the important factor and that actual exclusive control is not necessary. She then argues that
since defendant could regulate and control the use of
the sewer by the residents of the city, it cannot claim
that it had no control over what is placed into the
sewer system.

* * * *

It is one thing for a municipality to be able to
control what is dumped into a sewer as industrial waste
by a particular industry when such waste has characteristics peculiar to itself which can be identified if
found in the flow of sewer mains. It is another thing for
a municipality to be able to control the deposit of
plastic bags, toys, or fish heads, which, when found in
a sewer drain cannot be traced back to the depositor.
We deem the right of control in the latter instance, because of its difficulty of enforcement, to be more
theoretical than actual. The right to control is of no
consequence, unless it can be effectively exercised. Dean
Prosser has stated:

"* * * It must be enough that the defendant
has the right or power of control, and the opportunity to exercise it, as in the case of an owner
9

who is present while another is driving his car, or
a landowner who permits visitors to come on his
premises.* * *"
If a defendant does not have such an opportunity,
it cannot be saUi that "* * * the cause of the acci.
dent was probably such that the defendant would be
responsible for any negligence connected with it.* * *"
(Emphasis added) .
In the instant case, the jury found in answering Proposi.
tion No. 2 of the Special Verdict, that defendant did not have
exclusive control of the sewer line in question at the time it
was plugged. Thus one of the essential elements of invoking
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is missing, even though the
remaining elements of ( 1 ) the nature of the incident being
such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negli·
gence and ( 2 ) the superior know ledge of the defendant re·
garding the incident in question could be found in the jury's
affirmative answers to Propositions No. 3 and 4, respectively.
The affirmative answer to Proposition No. 5 is merely the con·
clusion that may be arrived at if the jury finds all the elements
of res ipsa loquitur to exist, which in this case it did not. The
affirmative answer to Proposition No. 6 would supply the
element of proximate cause, if the jury is allowed to indulge
in the inference of negligence via the res ipsa loquitur, which
defendant contends it could not do in this case because of the
lack of exclusive control of the sewer line by the defendant.

Proposition No. 1 regarding "responsible control" was
submitted by the trial court upon the request of plaintiffs, apparently to serve as a substitute finding in the event the jury
did not find the defendant had exclusive control of the sewer
line in question. The plaintiffs relied heavily upon J.I.F.U.
10

i

Instruction 17 .30 which provides for the alternative wording
of "for which he was responsible" in lieu of "in possession of
and under the exclusive control" as a basis for inferring negligence on the part of a defendant under certain factual situations.
Defendant does not view said instruction form as authority for eliminating the element of exclusive control as heretofore announced by this Court, but as a means of applying
the exclusive control doctrine under certain cases, such as where
a chief surgeon during a surgical procedure may be responsible
for and supervise the use of an instrumentality which requires
the assistance of other doctors in its use. Under such a situation, if the instrumentality were improperly used, the chief
surgeon should not be able to avoid liability merely because
others assisted him in the use thereof when he was actively
present and could effectively control its application. But to invoke the "responsible control" concept in a fact situation
where the defendant could not effectively control the instrumentality, although he may have had a technical right to do
so, would not be fair, just or equitable. As stated in Freitag
vs. City of Montello, supra, "The right to control is of no consequence unless it can be effectively exercised." To hold to the
contrary, could expand the res ipsa doctrine to the point of
imposing vicarious liability in absentia upon one who may
have had only a technical right to control when no specific
negligence has been shown and the actual cause of the injury
or loss is unknown.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant contends that the judgment of the trial court
in favor of plaintiffs on the issue of liability should be reversed
and judgment of no cause of action entered in favor of defendant.
Plaintiffs introduced no expert testimony to show that
defendant breached the standard of care required of sewer districts in this community in their routine maintenance procedures or with respect to any other particular instance or situation.
The jury as laymen cannot be permitted to speculate upon
what type of inspection or what type of instrument should be
used under some particular circumstance.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not have been
submitted to the jury because the uncontroverted facts from
plaintiffs' own witness established that defendant did not have
exclusive control of the sewer line with respect to objects that
might be injected to it at the time it became plugged, but that
to the contrary, approximately 270 homes and 100 manholes
were connected to the line above plaintiffs' residences through
which articles could have been injected into the sewer system
without the knowledge or control of defendant. Had the blockage resulted from root growth or a break in the sewer line,
such a circumstance could be said to be within the exclusive
control of defendant-since defendant in fact could control such
situations. Even if the blockage had resulted from an accumu·
lation of industrial waste which could be traced to a specific
source and thereby controlled by directive of the defendant,
the situation could be said to be within defendant's exclusive
control. But in this case where the items which constituted
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the plug are unknown and could have been injected into the
sewer system from one or more of several hundred readily
accessible entrances which defendant could in no way effectively control, the necessary element of exclusive control is
absent, and the jury so found after the doctrine had been erroneously submitted to it.
The concept of responsible control as a substitute for exclusive control should not have been submitted to the jury and
is not applicable to this case inasmuch as the defendant could
not as a practical matter exercise effective control of articles
that may have been injected into the sewer system.
WHEREFORE, appellant and defendant below prays
that the judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiffs be
reversed and that judgment of no cause of action be entered
on the Special Verdict returned by the jury and that defendant
be awarded its costs.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BRANDT &
WADSWORTH
By H. Wayne Wadsworth
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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